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Last April John Kenneth Galbraith died at the ageof 97. Galbraith was one of America’s mostfamous economists and a self-proclaimed liberal
(in the American sense of “statist” rather than in the
European sense of “believer in freedom”). His fame
came not from his technical accomplishments in aca-
demic economics but from his awesome writing ability,
evidenced in 33 books and many more articles. He
wrote almost all his books—certainly the ones that made
him famous—for a general audience.
He honed his writing skills while on
the board of editors of Fortune maga-
zine from 1943 to 1948. After that, he
never stopped.
Most free-market economists,
including me, have had little use for
the vast bulk of Galbraith’s writing
and thinking. This is understandable,
given that the main work by which he
was judged, and by which he appeared
to want to be judged, was weak, both
theoretically and empirically. But a
more-complete assessment of Gal-
braith’s writing leads me to conclude
that we free marketers have been
somewhat uncharitable to Galbraith. He had remarkable
insights, especially about government bureaucracy and
war, insights that would not have surprised a Ludwig
von Mises, an F.A. Hayek, or a Robert Higgs. Moreover,
in his opposition to war and his attempts to stop it, Gal-
braith showed some real courage.
Galbraith competes with Milton Friedman as the
most famous American twentieth-century economist,
but with two major differences. One was ideological.
Galbraith strongly believed in government power to off-
set the role of corporations in the economy and to sub-
sidize various activities, such as the arts, that he favored.
Indeed, in his 1973 book, Economics and the Public Pur-
pose, Galbraith claimed that “a new socialism” had
become “urgent” in major sectors of the economy.
Friedman, by contrast, was a strong believer in econom-
ic freedom. The second major difference between the
two was with respect to influence. Whereas Friedman
affected not only popular thinking but
also the thinking of economists, Gal-
braith affected only the former.
Galbraith recognized his lack of
influence on economists and often
claimed it was due to his having chal-
lenged the “conventional wisdom” (a
phrase he coined). He once remarked,
“In the choice between changing
one’s mind and proving there’s no
need to do so, most people get busy on
the proof.” In recalling critical com-
ments that David McCord Wright and
George Stigler had made on a paper
he presented at the American Eco-
nomic Association (AEA) meetings,
Galbraith wrote,“Neither approved new thought, how-
ever plausible.” But Wright’s and Stigler’s views on new
thought are irrelevant. By dismissing Wright and Stigler
that way, Galbraith avoided dealing with their criticisms.
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Galbraith recognized
his lack of influence
on economists and
often claimed it was
due to his having
challenged the
“conventional
wisdom” (a phrase 
he coined).
Other mainstream economists, such as Scott Gordon
and Robert Solow, also pointed out fundamental prob-
lems with his conclusions—problems Galbraith never
seriously grappled with. Instead he focused on the witty
epigram. As one critic pointed out, Galbraith’s main
form of argument for key assumptions in his model of
the economy was “vigorous assertion.” It’s not hard to
see why. In his autobiography, A Life in Our Times, Gal-
braith wrote that he learned a deep skepticism about sta-
tistics from a Harvard colleague, statistician William L.
Crum. Galbraith wrote: “In my adult life I have occa-
sionally been criticized for inadequacy in statistical or
econometric method. Crum is responsible; from him I
early formed the impression that no figure and no cal-
culation was really valid and that it was foolish to expose
one’s self by citing one.”
What an incredible overconclusion. No figure or cal-
culation was really valid? How would he know, except
by presenting contrary figures or corrections in calcula-
tions? And if he judged the invalidity based on these
contrary figures or calculations, wouldn’t he be accept-
ing their validity? Indeed, Galbraith backed up his skep-
ticism with a follow-up example: an incorrect
data-based prediction of an Alf Landon landslide over
Roosevelt in the 1936 presidential election. Of course,
Roosevelt won, a fact that Galbraith acknowledges—
which means that Galbraith must have trusted, within a
certain margin, the actual data on presidential voting.
Galbraith’s three most important books, measured by
sales and influence on popular thinking, were American
Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (1952),
The Affluent Society (1958), and The New Industrial State
(1967). In American Capitalism Galbraith argued that
giant firms had replaced small ones to the point where
the “perfectly competitive” model no longer applied to
much of the American economy. But not to worry, he
argued.The power of large firms was offset by the coun-
tervailing power of large unions, so that competing cen-
ters of power protected consumers. The late Nobel
laureate George Stigler gave a pointed empirical and
theoretical criticism at the aforementioned AEA meet-
ings. Stigler noted that before Franklin Roosevelt’s car-
tel-forming National Recovery Administration gave
monopoly power to large businesses, in five of the six
industries with the most powerful unions—building
trades, coal mining, printing, clothing, and musicians—
there were many small firms rather than, as Galbraith’s
theory would have predicted, a few large ones. More-
over, noted Stigler, even if large firms did have monop-
oly power and even if powerful labor unions did have
countervailing power, how would this assure that con-
sumers would be helped? Wasn’t it more plausible that
not only the firms but also the unions would have a
desire to limit output and keep prices high and would
simply be fighting over the monopoly rents?
Certainly, there are many examples of that having
happened in industries that the U.S. government did
cartelize. Between 1938, when the Civil Aeronautics
Board began to regulate the U.S. airline industry, and
1978, when it began to deregulate, the CAB allowed no
new airlines. Not surprisingly, fares were kept high and
the main beneficiaries of this cartel pricing were unions
of airline employees, not airline stockholders.“Counter-
vailing power” by the unions did no favors for American
travelers.
Starved Public Sector
In The Affluent Society Galbraith contrasted the afflu-ence of the private sector with the “squalor” of the
public sector, writing, “our houses are generally clean
and our streets generally filthy.” Galbraith attributed this
to our failure to give the government enough of our
resources to do its job. In none of his books and articles
could one find the more-straightforward explanation for
dirty streets—one that is based on incentives. Govern-
ment streets are an example of “the tragedy of the com-
mons”: No one owns them and, therefore, no one has an
incentive to take care of them. By contrast the privately
owned streets at Disneyland are amazingly clean.
Many people liked The Affluent Society because of
their view that Galbraith, like Thorstein Veblen before
him, attacked production that was geared to “conspicu-
ous consumption.” But Galbraith himself was adamant
that that was not his argument. Galbraith conceded that
“an admirable case can still be made” for satisfying even
consumer wants that “have bizarre, frivolous or even
immoral origins.” His argument against satisfying all
consumer demands was more subtle than Veblen’s. Gal-
braith wrote:“If the individual’s wants are to be urgent,
they must be original with himself. They cannot be
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urgent if they must be contrived for him.And above all,
they must not be contrived by the process of production
by which they are satisfied. . . . One cannot defend pro-
duction as satisfying wants if that production creates the
wants.”
Really? Hayek, co-winner of the 1974 Nobel Prize
in economics, delivered the most fundamental critique
of Galbraith’s thesis. Hayek conceded that most wants do
not originate with the individual; our innate wants, he
wrote,“are probably confined to food, shelter and sex.”
All other wants we learn from what we see around us.
Probably all our aesthetic feelings—our enjoyment of
music and literature, for example—are learned. So, wrote
Hayek,“to say that a desire is not important because it is
not innate is to say that the whole cultural achievement
of man is not important.” Hayek could
have taken the point further. Few of
us, for example, have an innate desire
for penicillin. It had to be first pro-
duced and then advertised before doc-
tors could know about it. And it’s safe
to say that we’ve found it very valu-
able.
Interestingly, when it came time 
to outline proposals for government 
policy, Galbraith didn’t adhere to his
own argument. He advocated that
money be taken from the private sec-
tor—that is, taxed away by force from
individuals—and put into government
programs, especially programs like education. Why is
education so valuable? Because it creates desires. Gal-
braith wrote:“[T]here can be little doubt that education
has a marked influence in widening the span of the indi-
vidual’s wants. . . . [M]ore esoteric desires—music and
fine arts, literary and scientific interests, and to some
extent travel—can normally be synthesized, if at all, only
on the basis of a good deal of prior education.”
In other words, Galbraith used the same argument for
government spending on education that he attacked as a
poor argument for private expenditure on “unnecessary
items.” Thus having accepted that wants acquired
through education are legitimate, he should have reject-
ed his earlier statement that wants which do not origi-
nate with the individual are illegitimate.
What is left of Galbraith’s argument? Only the tired
paternalist-authoritarian argument for government
spending that was always lurking between the lines: peo-
ple don’t want what’s good for them; the government
knows what’s good for them (never mind that the gov-
ernment was elected by these same ignorant people).
Therefore, the government should decide what people
are to have.
Galbraith’s magnum opus was The New Industrial
State, in which he argued that large firms dominate the
American economy. “The mature corporation,” he
wrote,“had readily at hand the means for controlling the
prices at which it sells as well as those at which it buys.
. . . Since General Motors produces some half of all the
automobiles, its designs do not reflect the current mode,
but are the current mode.The proper
shape of an automobile, for most peo-
ple, will be what the automobile mak-
ers decree the current shape to be.”
Well, not quite. Although GM
would have loved to “decree” the
shape of automobiles in the 1980s, it
seems consumers had different ideas.
That is one reason why GM, which
did produce about half of all U.S.-
bought autos in the 1960s, sells only a
quarter of all U.S.-bought autos today.
Interestingly, in his autobiography
Galbraith presented the very evidence
that should have talked him out of his
conclusion in The New Industrial State. In 1954 Galbraith
was on a consulting team hired by Canadian Pacific
Railway (CPR), Canada’s dominant railway at the time.
He saw quickly that CPR’s most promising assets were
its forests and land, not its railway. Yet CPR basically
ignored the team’s advice. He wrote,“The railway men
did not look with favor on such passing fads as air-
planes.”This should have clued him in to the idea that
large firms like CPR could “decree” virtually nothing.
To his credit, Galbraith ultimately admitted, with a
15-year lag, the major problem with his thesis. In July
1982 the steel and auto companies he had claimed were
immune from competition and recessions were laying
off workers in response to both foreign competition and
recession. Asked on “Meet the Press” whether he had
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underestimated the extent of risk that even large corpo-
rations face, Galbraith paused and replied,“Yeah, I think
I did.”
Ambassador to India
Galbraith was also President Kennedy’s U.S. ambas-sador to India in the early 1960s. While there,
Galbraith gave a series of speeches on economic devel-
opment in which he hailed the role of government
planning as opposed to economic freedom. In one
speech, Galbraith stated, “[T]he market cannot reach
forward to take great strides when these are called for.
. . . To trust to the market is to take an unacceptable 
risk that nothing, or too little, will happen.”The Indian
government took his advice. It did not
take the “risk” of relying on the market
but instead stuck with its system 
of detailed controls over every indus-
try. The result: “nothing, or too little”
happened. India was mired in poverty,
which began to lift only after some
decontrol started in 1991.
Galbraith was also one of the chief
price controllers during World War II,
as head of the Price Section of the U.S.
government’s Office of Price Admin-
istration. Unlike other economists
involved with price controls, such as
George Shultz during the Nixon
administration and Frank Taussig dur-
ing the Wilson administration, Gal-
braith emerged as an advocate of
permanent price controls, an unpopu-
lar position among economists. In his
autobiography Galbraith wrote about his experience as
a price controller in a way that recalls Ludwig von
Mises’s insights about how one intervention leads to
another, but with a very different tone and bottom line:
Since one firm’s prices could be another’s costs, the
uncontrolled or later-controlled prices were begin-
ning to unhinge those under earlier control.And the
profits of the later-controlled producers were a point
of comparison for those we had attended to earlier.
Also very often we found ourselves moving decisive-
ly on less important prices while more important
ones awaited action—vigorously on pepper, not at all
on bread. Finally we began to realize for the first time
what an unreasonably large number of products and
prices there were in the American economy.
Such are the woes of a central planner. Unfortunate-
ly Galbraith didn’t much talk about the even-greater
woes that the poor victims of his planning faced: fre-
quent shortages of gasoline, tires, nylon stockings, sugar,
eggs, and meat.The vast majority of the American pop-
ulation were the victims, and the beneficiaries were a
privileged few who happened, like Galbraith, to be high
in government or to have government connections.
Finally, in evaluating Galbraith’s
work on economics, we shouldn’t for-
get his disastrous 1977 PBS series,“The
Age of Uncertainty.” It was full of eco-
nomic error and absurd subjectivity,
truly Galbraith at his worst.The reader
who wants to know more details
should check two articles by David
Kelley: “Distorted Picture: A Hard
Look at Galbraith’s ‘Age of Uncertain-
ty,” Barron’s, July 18, 1977, and “ ‘Age of
Uncertainty’:The Taxpayer Should Ask
for His Money Back,” Barron’s, August
1, 1977, along with the revealing
response and rejoinder by Galbraith and
Kelley, respectively, in Barron’s, October
3, 1977.
So what’s to like about Galbraith’s
thinking and about his contributions to
society? A number of things. First, Gal-
braith was a strong opponent of military conscription.
Writing in his autobiography about the debate over
renewing the draft before the attack on Pearl Harbor,
Galbraith used his rapier wit to score a point against
advocates of the draft:“[T]he draft involved only the life
and liberty of the subject. Price control involved money
and property and thus had to be taken more seriously.”
Later, in the 1960s, he wrote,“[T]he draft survives prin-
cipally as a device by which we use compulsion to get
young men to serve at less than the market rate of pay.”
In the interest of full disclosure, though, I should point
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John Kenneth Galbraith, 1961
Photograph from the papers of John Kenneth Galbraith
in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum,
Boston
out that when I asked him in 1980 to sign “The Econ-
omists’ Statement Against the Draft,” which I had writ-
ten and got almost 300 economists, including Milton
Friedman and Alan Greenspan, to sign, he had his secre-
tary tell me,“Professor Galbraith will not be signing.”
Independent Mind
What else is impressive about Galbraith? Hebrought an independent mind to some of the
biggest issues of the twentieth century, those involving
war and peace. For all his refusal to look at evidence,
Galbraith did some of his most important work on the
effect of Allied bombing of Germany during World War
II.As a director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey he
went to Germany immediately after the European war
and headed a team to do an overall economic assessment
of the German mobilization and the effect of the bomb-
ing on that mobilization. Galbraith’s team included
economists Burton H. Klein, who made his reputation
with his work on that team, Nicholas (later Lord)
Kaldor, E.F. Schumacher (later author of Small Is Beauti-
ful),Tibor Scitovsky, and Edward Dennison.
What they found was devastating. Galbraith wrote
wittily,“Nothing in World War II air operations was sub-
ject to such assault as open agricultural land.” Successful
attacks on war-production plants were much rarer.
Whereas in 1940, 1941, and 1942, average monthly pro-
duction of Panzer vehicles was 136, 316, and 516,
respectively, in 1943 (when the bombing had begun in
earnest) and 1944, monthly Panzer production was up to
1,005 and 1,583, respectively.They found similar results
for airplane production. Galbraith’s boss, George Ball
(later undersecretary of state under Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson), found something equally disturbing about
the firebombing of cities.The RAF’s bombing of central
Hamburg, for example, destroyed many lives and many
businesses in the central city—restaurants, cabarets,
department stores, banks, and more. What were the
newly unemployed waiters, bank clerks, and entertainers
to do? That’s right: seek jobs in the war plants on the
edge of the cities “to get the ration cards that the Nazis
thoughtfully distributed to workers there.”
Moreover, the effect of the bombing was to shift con-
trol of production from the incompetent Hermann
Goering and the Luftwaffe to the far-more-competent
evil genius Albert Speer. In other words, the incredible
destruction that the British and U.S. air forces wreaked
on Germany, with the high loss of human life, didn’t
even have the intended effect of slowing Germany’s
war-production machine. Galbraith had to fight hard to
have his report published without it being rewritten to
hide the essential points.“I defended it,” he wrote,“with
a maximum of arrogance and a minimum of tact.”
In my experience as a senior economist with Presi-
dent Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, I found
tact to be strongly overrated.To prevail, Galbraith prob-
ably needed about as little tact as he used.
Galbraith also visited Japan, where he analyzed the
effect of the use of the atom bomb. He wrote:
Nor were the atomic bombs decisive. It has long been
held in justification that they made unnecessary an
invasion of the Japanese mainland and thus saved the
resulting fighting and thousands, possibly hundreds of
thousands, of casualties on both sides. On few matters
is the adverse evidence so strong.The bombs fell after
the decision had been taken by the Japanese govern-
ment to surrender.That the war had to be ended was
agreed at a meeting of key members of the Supreme
War Direction Council with the Emperor on June
20, 1945, a full six weeks before the devastation of
Hiroshima. The next steps took time. The Japanese
government had the usual bureaucratic lags as
between decision and action.
Not to be missed in a listing of Galbraith’s criticisms
of war are three later activities or writings. First, despite
the fact that he was close to Kennedy, Galbraith pulled
no punches in his evaluation of Kennedy’s decisions
during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In his autobiogra-
phy, Galbraith pointed out that Kennedy’s actions almost
destroyed the world and that he took the risk so as not
to appear “insufficiently stalwart.” “Domestic American
political considerations,” wrote Galbraith, “intruded far
too deeply on an issue that threatened the end for all
time of the civilized world.”
Second was Galbraith’s early thoughtful and analytic
opposition to the Vietnam War. Even though Galbraith
was an insider with Johnson’s administration, he criti-
cized the war as early as 1966.After trying personally to
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persuade LBJ, Galbraith went public and made opposi-
tion to the war one of his causes.
Finally, Galbraith learned early in his dealings with
the military not to have any special respect for their
opinions just because they wore a uniform and had
risked their lives.His short 1969 book,How to Control the
Military, is still well worth reading today. Indeed, in my
opinion it and his autobiography rank as his two best
books. Here is one of its best paragraphs:
The problem of military power is not unique; it is
merely a rather formidable example of the tendency
of an organization, in an age of organization, to
develop a life and purpose and truth of its own.This
tendency holds for all great bureaucracies, both pub-
lic and private. And their action is not what serves a
larger public interest, their belief does not reflect the
reality of life.What is done and what is believed are,
first and naturally, what serve the goals of the bureau-
cracy itself. Action in the organization interest, or in
response to the bureaucratic truth, can thus be a for-
mula for public disservice or even public disaster.
Many of my fellow free-market economists would do
well to understand this insight fully, to understand that
the bureaucracy known as the Department of Defense
promotes defense about as much as the Department of
Health and Human Services promotes health and
human services. Whatever his other failings, Galbraith
got this right.
Finally, I confess some sadness. In November 1981 I
was the warm-up speaker for Galbraith at an event held
by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.We had
a short, friendly interaction, but I went into it knowing
virtually nothing about Galbraith’s keen observations on
war and peace. How much different our conversation
and my speech might have been had I paid Galbraith the
respect that was his due.
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